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INTRODUCTION 
Social workers often work with child clients who need to give evidence in court. Unfortunately 
these children are vulnerable to secondary systemic abuse. Feelings of intimidation at court 
may also adversely affect the accuracy of their evidence, leading to an inappropriate outcome 
(Hall, 2009; Muller & Van der Merwe, 2005). Many countries have therefore introduced 
technology-based protective measures to reduce the stress experienced by child witnesses. 
These include pre-recorded evidence, separate-venue testimony with a video link, and 
intermediaries. In South Africa it is important that social workers have a good understanding of 
the legal framework. They are often in a position to provide pre-court assessments motivating 
for protective measures. They may also be called upon to give expert evidence in court on 
whether a particular child requires a separate venue or an intermediary. 
Social workers may alternatively be involved by serving as intermediaries themselves. 
Intermediaries act as a communication conduit when a child witness is being questioned in 
court. Instead of an opposing party or lawyer being able to address questions directly to the 
child, they are conveyed to the intermediary. The intermediary then communicates them to the 
child in non-threatening, age-appropriate language. The child‟s replies are also conveyed 
through the intermediary. So far in South Africa intermediaries have been used mainly for 
criminal cases, and particularly ones involving sexual offences against children. Internationally 
it has been recognised that sexual offence victims are amongst the most vulnerable of all child 
witnesses (Hall, 2009). 
This article first explains and evaluates the legislation which provides for protective measures 
in South African criminal cases. It then analyses two important cases. In the first the High 
Court found in 2008 that there was inadequate protection for child witnesses. In the second the 
protective measures were assessed for the first time by South Africa‟s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court, in 2009. In the third part of the article another significant and related 
development is considered. Intermediaries have been introduced to children‟s courts as a result 
of the Children‟s Act 38 of 2005, which came into force on 1 April 2010. The questions of 
whether a correct approach has been adopted in the Act and the implications of recent case law 
for children‟s court proceedings are explored. The final part of the article offers some 
conclusions on whether the law has developed sufficiently and makes recommendations on 
how social workers can make the best possible use of it. 
LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 
In 1991 Section 170A was introduced into the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Since this 
came into force in 1993, it has been possible for certain child witnesses in criminal cases to be 
assisted by intermediaries. They do so via electronic devices and closed-circuit television 
viewed in the courtroom. A child is defined for this purpose as any person under 18 years of 
age. A particularly important aspect is the legal grounds for appointment of an intermediary. In 
terms of section 170A(1): 
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Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and if it appears to such 
court that it would expose any witness under the age of eighteen years to undue mental 
stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings, the court may subject to 
subsection (4) appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to enable such 
witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary [emphasis added]. 
In addition to the appointment of an intermediary, the court may also order that the witness 
give evidence in an informally arranged room provided with electronic or other devices 
(section 170A(3)). Persons who can serve as intermediaries are medical practitioners with a 
specialisation in paediatrics or psychiatry, family counsellors, child care workers with a two-
year course in child and youth care work, registered social workers with at least two years 
experience, teachers with four years experience, and clinical, educational or counselling 
psychologists (GG 15024 of July 1993 as amended by GG 17882 of 28 February 1997, and 
amended by GG 22435 of 2 July 2001). 
Section 170A(2)(b) provides that if an intermediary has been appointed he/she must “convey 
the general purport of any question” and that all examination and cross-examination of the 
child witness must take place through the intermediary. The intermediary will therefore listen 
on earphones to a question directed to the child and then communicate it to the child. As noted 
by Jonker and Swanzen (2007:6): “The intermediary has the duty of buffering aggression and 
intimidation….” 
Section 170A has been criticised by some commentators because it is discretionary and 
therefore does not provide an absolute right for all child witnesses to have an intermediary 
(Muller & Tait, 1999; Simon, 2006). A further limitation is that undue mental stress or 
suffering by the witness has to be proved as a ground. Therefore an expert witness, which 
usually includes social workers or psychologists, may be needed to testify about what the child 
would be likely to experience in open court (Mellis, n.d.). Even if the likelihood of undue 
mental stress or suffering is proved, the presiding officer still has a choice. As can be seen from 
section 170A as quoted above, he or she „may‟ choose whether to allow the appointment of an 
intermediary. This wide discretion has made it easy to avoid the extra procedural step of 
appointing an intermediary. Muller and Van der Merwe (2005:42) state that “Despite the fact 
that judicial officers are inherently authorised to take control of court proceedings, many still 
play a passive role and remain aloof due to their fear of being seen to be partial”. Inconsistent 
applications have resulted because of the discretion and this is a matter of concern. Also, undue 
mental stress or suffering is a vague concept which is not defined (Muller & Tait, 1999; 
Schutte, 2005).  
Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was enacted in 1996. It provides for 
witnesses to give evidence “by means of closed-circuit television or similar electronic media”. 
This may be requested by the public prosecutor or the witness, or ordered by the court. The 
court may grant requests subject to “available or obtainable” facilities and to “prevent the 
likelihood that prejudice or harm might result to any person if he or she testifies or is present at 
such proceedings”. This effectively provides for a second protective measure, which entails 
giving evidence from a separate venue without the assistance of an intermediary. The South 
African Law Commission (2002) criticised the available or obtainable facilities limitation. 
They recommended an amendment to the legislation to enable transfers of cases to courts with 
available facilities. Whilst section 158 protects witnesses from the presence of the accused, it 
does not shield them from aggressive cross-examination and confusing legal language.  
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The original legislation has thus not been optimally effective in protecting children. 
Amendments to the legislation 
The inadequacy of the legislation was recognised and in 2007 it was amended. The Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (hereafter the 2007 
Amendments) extended the grounds for the appointment of intermediaries. Now not only 
persons under 18 years of age, but also persons “under the biological and mental age of 
eighteen years” exposed to undue mental stress or suffering are eligible to receive assistance 
from intermediaries.  
Also, the 2007 Amendments added subsections 158(5) and 170A(7) to the Criminal Procedure 
Act. These provide, respectively, that criminal courts must immediately give reasons for 
refusing requests by the prosecution to provide evidence via electronic means from a separate 
room or to use an intermediary. A limitation is that the 2007 Amendments only impose the duty 
to give immediate reasons where it is a child complainant and not other child witnesses. Also, 
the child must be under the age of 14. The Amendments do not address the main criticisms of 
commentators. The wide discretion for presiding officers and the vague legal grounds remain. 
Therefore, the problem of a lack of consistency in allowing protective measures was not 
addressed. 
In the High Court case of S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane (2008) the constitutional validity of the 
sections of the Criminal Procedure Act providing for protective measures came under judicial 
scrutiny. The case subsequently went up to the Constitutional Court. Here, it was reported as 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others (2009 – hereafter the Director of Public Prosecutions case). As a 
result of these judgments, the law on protective measures has been clarified and developed. 
Each case will be discussed separately. 
RECENT CASE LAW  
The High Court Case 
In S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane criminal sentences in two similar magistrates‟ court cases were 
considered together by the High Court judge, Bertelsmann J. The first accused had raped an 11-
year-old child and the second had raped a 13-year-old. In the first case an intermediary for the 
child complainant had been appointed by the magistrate, based on an assessment by a social 
worker. Yet in the second case the High Court found that the question of whether the 
complainant needed an intermediary had not even been considered. He stated “The impression 
is created that there was no intermediary available…, so that the court, the prosecution and the 
defence regarded it as useless to investigate whether a 13-year-old might be in need of such 
assistance” (para 4(i)). 
The High Court reacted strongly to the long-standing problem of inconsistency in decisions by 
lower magistrates‟ courts. It concluded that the wide discretion which section 170A leaves to 
courts in considering whether to allow intermediaries renders it unconstitutional. The judge 
reasoned that the resulting lack of uniformity for child witnesses in similar circumstances is 
inconsistent with section 28(2) of the Constitution. Section 28(2) requires that the best interests 
of children be treated as paramount. He stated that the requirement in section 170A for a child 
witness to be exposed at court to “undue” stress and suffering before an intermediary may be 
appointed: 
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... places a limitation upon the best interests of the child that is neither rational nor 
justifiable….To demand an extraordinary measure of stress or anguish before the 
assistance of an intermediary can be called upon clearly discriminates against the child 
and is constitutionally untenable (para 79).  
With reference to the 2007 Amendments, the High Court had concerns about subsections 
158(5) and 170A(7). As mentioned above, these require courts to immediately provide reasons 
when refusing applications for protective measures for complainants aged below 14. 
Bertelsmann J reasoned that this produced an illogical age discrimination against older 
children, because they were not provided with the same right. The judge also found the 
Amendment irrational because it protected complainants, but not other child witnesses (para 
83). He concluded that subsections 158(5) and 170A(7) created such a degree of discrimination 
between children that they were unconstitutional. This meant that they were no longer valid 
law. 
The High Court‟s finding of invalidity removed key parts of the law. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and other interested parties 
reacted by seeking clarity from a higher forum, the Constitutional Court.  
The Constitutional Court Case 
In a complete reversal of the High Court judgment, the Constitutional Court in the Director of 
Public Prosecutions case concluded that sections 158(5) and 170A must continue to stand 
because they are constitutional. Ngcobo J (subsequently appointed Chief Justice) wrote the 
majority judgment for the Constitutional Court. The Court decided that the High Court was 
incorrect in concluding that a child witness must first be exposed to undue mental stress or 
suffering. Rather, the proactive intention is to prevent such exposure (para 110). The 
Constitutional Court then indicated the procedure that courts must follow. It stated that all child 
witnesses in criminal cases must in future be properly assessed before court hearings 
commence. If this assessment indicates that an intermediary is needed, then the prosecution 
must apply for one at the very beginning of the trial (para 111).  
Particularly important is a further ruling by the Constitutional Court that magistrates or judges 
themselves must inquire into the need for appointment of a protective measure, if the 
prosecutor does not raise the issue and a child witness is to appear. Presiding officers must 
apply the best interests of the child principle and weigh up relevant evidence when conducting 
such inquiries. According to the Constitutional Court: 
What is required of the judicial officer is to consider whether, on the evidence presented 
to him or her, viewed in the light of the objectives of the constitution and the subsection, 
it is in the best interests of the child for an intermediary to be appointed (para 115). 
This ruling is a very significant development. It means that whenever child witnesses or older 
vulnerable witnesses are called in criminal cases, the possible need for a separate venue and/or 
intermediary must be canvassed. Prosecutors and courts will no longer be able to avoid this 
simply because it is not easy or convenient to obtain the resources required. It would even 
appear that presiding officers must obtain sufficient evidence on the issue if it is not already 
available. The Constitutional Court has therefore extended protective requirements by means of 
this important procedural directive. 
The Constitutional Court went on to consider the High Court‟s finding that section 170A is 
unconstitutional because it confers a completely unconstrained discretion on judicial officers. 
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Ngcobo J held that on this aspect the section is once again entirely valid. Rather than accepting 
the prevailing view that appointment of intermediaries should be compulsory for all child 
witnesses, he decided that a broad discretion is in fact useful. It “enables courts, on a case-by-
case basis, to determine whether the services of an intermediary are required” (para 124). It 
allowed for a flexible weighing up of relevant criteria such as a child witnesses‟ age, maturity, 
degree of independence, feelings and wishes, and “the nature of the offence” (para 124). He 
noted that some older children might not even want an intermediary. Hence, the discretion was 
needed to allow flexibility in decision making. This was essential for ensuring that the best 
interests of child witnesses are paramount in each case, as required by section 28(2) of the 
Constitution (paras 125 & 129). He reasoned that problems with section 170A are caused, not 
by the provision itself, “but in the manner in which it is interpreted and implemented” (para 
131). He concluded that what is therefore required is proper training in law and procedure of 
presiding officers and prosecutors (para 131). The Constitutional Court singled out training of 
prosecutors as particularly important, because it is they who must decide whether to bring an 
application for a protective measure (Muller & Van Der Merwe (2004) on the training 
required).  
Turning to the 2007 Amendments, the Constitutional Court decided that “Sections 158(5) and 
S170A(7) are capable of being read in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution” (para 
159). They must be interpreted as not changing a general pre-existing requirement that a 
criminal court must give reasons for refusing to allow the use of CCTV or an intermediary in 
respect of all children below 18 and not merely those below 14 (para 159). It should do so as it 
would for any other important decision. As Ngcobo J reasoned: 
The issue is one of emphasis rather than one of exclusion. What the subsections 
emphasise is that the younger the child, the more the need exists for protection. Selecting 
the age of 14 years may perhaps be perceived as arbitrary. So are all choices relating to 
age. This, however, does not detract from the fact that the subsections recognise that 
younger children may need protection more than older children. As pointed out earlier the 
protection given to children must be appropriate to their age, level of maturity and unique 
needs. These sections recognise this. They also recognise that vulnerability decreases with 
age (para 160). 
Ngcobo J thus decided that the purpose of the 2007 Amendment was simply to give greater 
protection to younger children. He concluded it is “neither irrational nor unfair” for judicial 
officers to have to give reasons “immediately upon refusal” for children under 14, and only 
much later when presenting their final judgment for older children (para 161). He went so far as 
to praise the Amendments for usefully reminding “presiding officers of the greater vulnerability 
of younger children”. Thus he concluded that the High Court was wrong in finding subsections 
158(5) and 170A(7) unconstitutional. 
THE CHILDREN’S ACT 38 OF 2005 
Aside from the first-ever detailed assessment of legal protective measures by the Constitutional 
Court, another significant development is extension of the use of intermediaries beyond 
criminal matters to a wide range of care and parental responsibilities cases dealt with by the 
children‟s courts. The children involved have often been subjected to sexual offences, other 
abuse or neglect. This means that they fall into the highest vulnerability category (Hall, 2009) 
and are just as likely to need protective measures as child witnesses in criminal courts. The 
introduction of intermediaries into children‟s courts is in terms of section 61(2) of the 
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Children‟s Act 38 of 2005. The Act and regulations published on 1 April 2010 represent a 
substantial initiative aimed at radically modernising parenting and child law in South Africa.  
Section 61(2) reads: 
A child who is a party or a witness in a matter before a children‟s court must be 
questioned through an intermediary as provided for in section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) if the court finds that this would be in the best 
interests of that child.  
As can be seen, it is possible to appoint an intermediary to assist a vulnerable child in any of 
the matters that come before children‟s courts in terms of the new legislation. These include a 
wide range of cases involving parental responsibilities, mandatory alternative care, and 
adoption – including inter-country adoption, parental abduction, child trafficking and surrogate 
motherhood.  
The ability to appoint intermediaries for child witnesses is a significant step forward in the 
children‟s courts. However, the method of incorporation by using section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act means that the vague ground of “undue mental stress or suffering” will have to 
be applied before appointing an intermediary in a children‟s court case. The wide discretion for 
presiding officers, even where there is undue stress or suffering (as discussed above), will also 
be imported. In the children‟s courts, as in the criminal courts, the extent to which magistrates 
feel motivated to take the extra steps required to appoint intermediaries will be a crucial factor. 
This will certainly impact on how many children actually benefit. This raises the question of 
whether the Director of Public Prosecutions case will have to be followed in children‟s courts. 
Of particular importance is whether the ruling applies that, if the necessity for an intermediary 
is not sufficiently canvassed by the parties, then the magistrate must conduct an inquiry and 
even solicit additional evidence, if required. 
One interpretation would be that, because Director of Public Prosecutions was a criminal 
matter, it doesn‟t apply to children‟s courts. A contrary view would be that it does apply 
because the court was specifically considering how section 170A of the Criminal Procedure 
Act must be implemented. And section 61(2) of the Children‟s Act expressly incorporates that 
provision into children‟s court procedures. It is this second and broader interpretation which 
should be preferred. What was really at issue was sufficient protection for child witnesses. For 
children giving evidence, exactly the same challenges can arise in children‟s courts as in 
criminal courts. For here also a child may be too terrified to provide accurate testimony when 
being cross-examined in close physical proximity to an abusive adult. It is to be hoped, 
therefore, that the Constitutional Court‟s instruction that the question of an intermediary must 
be properly dealt with in every case will be extended to children‟s courts. Since social workers 
will often have full party status in children‟s courts (Children‟s Act, 2005: section 1), and not 
merely expert witness status as in the past, they will be in a strong position to request 
intermediaries. 
DISCUSSION  
The two major points of disagreement in the 2008 and 2009 judgments were, firstly, the 
appropriateness of an absolute right to protective measures and, secondly, whether the 
legislation discriminated unfairly against children of different ages. If the High Court‟s 2008 
judgment had been upheld, all child witnesses would have gained a right to testify from 
separate rooms either with or without intermediaries. Distinctions between children under and 
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over 14, and the vague “undue mental stress or suffering” ground, would all have disappeared 
from our law. In order to meet the new standard of protective measures available to all child 
witnesses, the government would have been placed under great pressure to improve resources 
at courts. This would have been a very positive development. The High Court was correct in 
concluding that the vague requirement of undue mental stress or suffering should be removed. 
The starting point in every case should rather be a presumption that child witnesses require a 
protective measure, unless they state otherwise or there are strong counter-considerations.  
Whilst the Constitutional Court adopted a different approach, it does provide a higher standard 
than currently exists. Its ruling that all judicial officers must evaluate the need for protective 
measures does support careful weighing up of the needs of each individual child. It should be 
noted that what the Court specifically required was that presiding officers must supplement any 
shortfall in the parties‟ canvassing. If necessary, they must conduct a “trial within a trial” 
inquiry which could even engender calling relevant witnesses themselves. Should they fail to 
do so, presiding officers run the risk of their decisions being reviewed as procedurally irregular 
by higher courts. This is likely to encourage them to motivate for adequate resources at their 
court centres. It can be argued that the Constitutional Court‟s position, as opposed to the High 
Court, is more realistically in line with a progressive realisation of services within available 
resources in a developing country. At present only about 14% of all criminal courts in South 
Africa have separate-venue video linkages and intermediaries (2008 case: para 90; see also 
Jonker & Swanzen, 2007; Matthias, 2004; Ovens, Lambrechts & Prinsloo, 2001; Reyneke & 
Kruger, 2006). 
Although the Constitutional Court‟s approach to an absolute right to protective measures may 
be seen as realistic, the same cannot be said for its views supporting discrimination between 
different ages of child witnesses. This can be seen from its reasoning on the 2007 Amendments. 
It upheld distinctions between complainants under and over 14. It thus validated the law 
requiring immediate reasons from courts when refusing protective measures only for 
complainants under 14. For all children, the time when reasons should be required is clearly 
before they testify. Firstly, this would help child witnesses to understand legal proceedings 
(Article 31(b) of the 2005 UN Guidelines on Justice Matters involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses of Crime). Secondly, having ruled that a child may not receive measures, a judicial 
officer will hardly be in a good position to be completely objective afterwards. He or she will 
obviously have to give reasons which justify the refusal. And the main rationale put forward by 
the Court that the 2007 Amendments underscore the special vulnerability of under-14-year-olds 
ignores the fact that it entirely leaves out under-14-year-old witnesses who are not 
complainants. In England distinctions between different categories of child witnesses were 
abandoned as unfair (Hall, 2009) and the Constitutional Court should have supported the High 
Court on prevention of discrimination. 
Courts should be obliged to keep in mind the international standard that victims of sexual 
offences, abuse or neglect are an especially vulnerable category. Article 12 of the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and article 4(2) of the 1990 African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child both require that children be consulted when important 
decisions about them are to be taken. Articles 19(f), 20 and 21(b) of the 2005 UN Guidelines 
require that child witnesses be consulted about protective measures. Thus the position in South 
Africa ought to be that any child witness of sufficient maturity must be given an opportunity to 
express his or her wishes about protective measures – including any preference on a particular 
type. As pointed out by Hall (2009:76), to enable an informed view, children should first be 
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shown the courtroom and have alternatives explained. Once the wishes of the child have been 
established, this should become one factor carefully weighed up by the court in deciding what, 
if any, protective measures are to be selected.  
Concerning the extension of protective measures to children‟s courts, section 61(2) of the 
Children‟s Act, although a move in the right direction, is inadequate. Omission of the option 
for children simply to give evidence from a separate venue via video link without an 
intermediary was a grave oversight. Cases may well occur where children prefer this option or 
when a suitably qualified intermediary is not available. Because children may be just as 
vulnerable in children‟s courts as criminal courts, there is no logical reason why options in the 
former should be more limited. In fact, given its internationally recognised advantages, the 
possibility of pre-recorded evidence should also have been allowed for in the Children‟s Act. 
As Hall (2009:84) and Simon (2006) have pointed out, the greater scope for free-flowing 
narrative and stress reduction which pre-recording permits means that in some cases it is the 
best option. 
The second shortcoming in section 61(2) is that the possibility of intermediaries in children‟s 
courts has been enabled by means of a cross-reference to section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. As shown, this raises a technical debate about whether criminal case judgments 
interpreting section 170A must also in future be applied in children‟s courts. Tying criminal 
court and children‟s court procedures together is likely to lead to complications. It would have 
been much simpler merely to state in the Children‟s Act that the appropriateness of utilising an 
intermediary must be considered by the magistrate whenever a child needs to provide 
testimony. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORKERS 
The Constitutional Court‟s instruction that all child witnesses must in future be assessed before 
appearing in court, together with the extension of intermediaries to children‟s courts, has 
important implications for social workers. Their assessment work relating to protection 
measures is likely to increase substantially over time. It is therefore important that they take 
note of the basic criteria listed by the Constitutional Court. As mentioned these are: “age, 
maturity, degree of independence, feelings and wishes” of the witness and the nature of the 
case. It is particularly the child‟s feelings and wishes which have tended to receive insufficient 
attention in South Africa. When assessing a child who proves to be mature enough, social 
workers should as a matter of good practice and in accordance with the international 
instruments cited above always first establish whether the child feels the need for a protective 
measure. If so, they should then explore which measure the child prefers after there has been an 
opportunity to see the court facilities. In their pre-hearing documentation social workers should 
as a standard procedure indicate both what (if any) measure the child desires and what they 
regard as best, with reasons. 
The Constitutional Court‟s conclusion that legal professionals need to be educated to change 
their operational culture and become more open to promoting protective measures in 
accordance with the needs of individual children also has implications for social workers. This 
is a conclusion supported by recent findings in England (Hall, 2009). Social workers should use 
their influence as assessors of protective measures. As a form of child advocacy, they should 
seize every opportunity to encourage legal professionals to consider utilising protective 
measures and consulting directly with children on how they would like to give evidence. The 
new party status for social workers in children‟s courts will even allow welfare organisations to 
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require a review by a higher court, if protective measures are not properly considered by 
magistrates. To increase the available options for children, social workers, as key role players, 
should more generally advocate for improvements in the law to allow the possibility of pre-
recorded evidence for criminal cases and the introduction of more than merely one protective 
measure in the children‟s courts.  
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